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Introduction
Over the past decades, many books have examined 
Islamists’ ideologies and their impact on the social 
and political orders of  their respective countries. 
The 2011 Arab Spring, which allowed for the swift 
ascent of  Islamists all over the Arab world, tested 
the claims of  Islamists against reality. Tunisia’s 
Islamist Ennahdha movement and party gained 
41 percent of  the vote in Tunisia’s first free and 
democratic elections in October 2011 and became 
the largest party in its National Constituent Assem-
bly (NCA). It soon forged a ruling troika with two 
non-Islamist partners. Ennahdha, leading amid tur-
bulent revolutionary waves and conditions of  per-
sistent polarization, offers an interesting opportu-
nity to scrutinize the Islamist vision of  a social and 
political order and what it means in practical terms. 
This paper examines the party’s ideological claims 
and practical positions on democracy and pluralism, 
gender order, and the rule of  sharia.
Democracy and Pluralism
Ennahdha has repeatedly demanded a parliamen-
tary democratic system to protect public sover-
eignty as well as political freedoms. The party’s 
2011 electoral platform states: “The mission and 
priorities of  Ennahdha consist of  the pride of  
Tunisia, its progress, independence, sovereignty, 
its republican system based on the separation of  
powers, the independence of  its judiciary, democ-
racy, good governance, justice and equality for all 
citizens.”1 In this context, Ennahdha’s party plat-
form considers human rights to be compatible with 
Islamic values. Instead of  following the well-known 
Islamist slogan “Islam is the solution,” Ennahdha 
follows slogans such as “Islam is democracy” and 
“Islam is human rights.” The statements of  Ennah-
dha members reveal a similar picture. “We believe 
that we can be perfect democrats and Muslims at 
the same time.”2
While democracy as a political and institutional 
order is clearly uncontested within Ennahdha, 
pluralistic (i.e. liberal) norms are more controver-
sial. The party platform demands equality among 
citizens and human rights for every Tunisian 
citizen. Religious minority rights and freedom of  
press and expression are also highlighted in the 
party platform. At the same time, Ennahdha’s 
pluralistic commitment has boundaries, espe-
cially when it comes to the discussion about so 
called “blasphemy laws” (criminalizing the insult, 
offences or contempt toward religion). Ennah-
dha’s official position – and the position of  many 
interviewed Islamist MPs – is in favor of  criminal-
izing alleged offenses against “the sacred.” The 
MPs argued that such laws are necessary to fight 
incitement to discrimination, hostility, and vio-
lence. However, Ennahdha members had different 
views on what scope of  such laws should have. 
While some interviewed MPs supported a broad 
protection by law of  everything that is “sacred,” 
others expressed the need to clearly define what 
“sacred” means and to limit “blasphemy laws” in 
order to avoid selective, arbitrary, and discrimina-
tory implementation. Other Ennahdha MPs made 
it very clear that they refer to offences against 
religion when they talk about the “sacred.” As 
one MP put it, “The problem is when you insult. 
When you are not in an intellectual debate, theo-
logical, philosophical debate. You are insulting, 
you are behaving in a manner which expresses no 
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respect for others. This is problematic.”3 Ennah-
dha’s commitment to pluralism can be stretched 
to its limits when its members believe that their 
religion is under attack.
Conservative Gender Order and 
Sharia
Ennahdha’s position on gender issues is rather 
ambiguous. On the one hand, it emphasizes its 
full commitment to women’s rights and female 
participation. It aims to promote women’s par-
ticipation in the social, political, cultural and eco-
nomic sphere. “It thus aims, in the coming phase, 
to: Protect and consolidate the achievements 
of  Tunisian women, continuing to further their 
social, political, cultural, and economic develop-
ment until they achieve full citizenship as equal 
partners in building the country and its social 
wellbeing in all spheres.”4
While this position distances Ennahdha from 
fundamentalist positions restricting women to the 
private sphere, the group’s position on women is 
evidently traditional and conservative. It equates 
the notion of  “family” with the traditional family 
unit, including marriage and children. One lead-
ing Ennahdha member explained why unmarried, 
single mothers should not receive the same social 
and legal protection as married couples and their 
children. She underlined the need for their chil-
dren to receive social and legal protection but said 
that they should not be treated legally on equal 
terms. “We do not want to normalize children 
outside marriage.”5
Another telling example of  Ennahdha’s conser-
vatism is the rejection of  certain articles of  the 
CEDAW (Committee on the Elimination of  Dis-
crimination against Women) by some members. “If  
you go into the detail of  some of  these articles you 
will find that they go against some fundamental 
texts.”6 Ennahdha’s conservative and patriarchal 
values can manifest themselves in discriminatory 
heritage, marital, and divorce laws.
As for sharia, most Ennahdha members follow 
a reformist understanding of  Islamic law, which 
sees it as a mostly abstract ideal ethical framework 
and does not ask for the imposition of  rigid legal 
codes. “I believe that Islam is a system of  values.”7 
Nevertheless, Ennahdha avoids the use of  the 
term sharia, and relies instead on references to the 
Islamic identity: “cultural and civilizational heri-
tage of  Tunisian society and its Arab and Islamic 
identity.”8
Ennahdha’s Vision in Practice
Unlike other Islamists, Ennahda has not only 
ascended to power in a democratic manner but also 
had to work with non-Islamists partners. Moreover, 
it stayed in power long enough for its democratic 
claims to be tested. One crucial indicator of  its 
democratic credentials is the negotiation of  the 
new constitution and the way in which it has trans-
lated its vision into particular articles of  Tunisia’s 
new constitution.
In accordance with Ennahdha’s concept of  a dem-
ocratic political system, the new Tunisian Constitu-
tion ensures basic democratic principles. Article 2 
enshrines Tunisia as a “civil state, based on the 
principle of  citizenship, the will of  its people, and 
the supremacy of  the law” and cannot be modified 
in any future revisions of  the constitution.9
These democratic achievements reflect the will of  
all political fractions in the NCA, including Ennah-
dha, to overcome decades of  dictatorship and 
repression. A more controversial topic while nego-
tiating the constitution was the notion of  freedom 
of  expression. Ennahdha members announced 
on numerous occasions that freedom of  expres-
sion should adhere to Islamic values and respect 
religion as well as religious figures. In a previous 
draft, Ennahdha members supported a constitu-
tional clause that made clear that the “state is the 
protector of  the sacred.” The introduction of  this 
so-called “blasphemy clause” by Ennahdha mem-
bers of  the Rights and Liberties Committee caused 
heated debate in Tunisia as well as abroad. Indeed, 
it triggered one of  the most divisive debates dur-
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ing the drafting of  the new constitution. The vague 
wording of  this clause triggered fears about broad 
restrictions of  freedom of  expression and met with 
strong resistance in liberal parties and civil society, 
whose participants have warned that such laws 
could be used to stifle discussion and dissent in 
the public sphere. Ennahdha was accused of  intro-
ducing the legal framework to censor politicians, 
journalists, intellectuals, and artists by criminalizing 
blasphemy.
All these developments caused Ennahdha to 
rethink the wording of  the constitution and discuss 
the issue with other party members as well as with 
external experts. Despite the fact that some party 
members still see the need to protect the “sacred,” 
Ennahdha has accepted the removal of  criminaliz-
ing language. Many have explained their change of  
opinion by noting that the constitution is not the 
place for penalizing legislation and that such a pro-
cedure contradicts Ennahdha’s gradual approach of  
convincing, not coercing.
Although Tunisia’s new constitution does not 
include such a “blasphemy clause,” its Article 6 
remains rather vague and could not dispel all the 
fears. It will likely perpetuate further debates about 
the role of  religion in Tunisian public life.
While disagreeing on other issues, MPs in the NCA 
were united on a cross-party basis that women’s 
legal achievements in Tunisia should not be cur-
tailed. Several articles of  the new constitution 
reflect this broad agreement, especially Article 46: 
“The State shall commit to protecting women’s 
achieved rights and seek to support and develop 
them. The State shall guarantee equal opportunities 
between men and women in bearing of  all the vari-
ous responsibilities in all fields.” The constitution 
further commits the state to eliminating violence 
against women and grants women the right to run 
for the position of  president.
Ennahdha’s willingness to foster women’s rights, 
which was already stated in its 2011 electoral plat-
form, explains its support for these legal achieve-
ments. However, its conservative and religiously 
legitimized idea of  a gender order led to much 
debate during the drafting of  the new constitution. 
This is especially true for Article 28, the first con-
stitutional draft of  which stated that the “roles” of  
men and women “complement one another within 
the family.” This wording triggered demonstra-
tions, protests, and a firestorm of  criticism from 
local and international media. Misinterpretations 
and rumors that were circulated in the national and 
international press led many to believe that Ennah-
dha wanted to reduce women to the “comple-
ments” of  men, instead of  acknowledging their  
full equality.
Although these rumors were somewhat mislead-
ing, the wording of  the article implied what many 
Ennahdha members confirmed. They are con-
vinced that men and women are equal before God 
but that they should indeed have different roles 
within society, especially with regard to family obli-
gations. From a women’s rights perspective, Article 
28 did indeed have problematic wording, since it 
did not use clear legal language that affirmed equal-
ity. Women’s rights activists and other civil society 
groups accused Ennahdha of  threatening the legal 
achievements of  women in Tunisia with a conser-
vative and patriarchal Islamic agenda.
As a result of  the domestic and international pres-
sure, Ennahdha’s members of  the Rights and Lib-
erties Committee replaced the vague language with 
less ambiguous wording: “All citizens, male and 
female alike, have equal rights and duties, and are 
equal before the law without any discrimination” 
(Article 21). Once again, Ennahdha made ideologi-
cal concessions and proved itself  capable of  adapt-
ing to the political context.
Ennahdha members provoked another firestorm 
of  criticism, however, with their initial proposal of  
an article stipulating “sharia as the main source of  
legislation.” To the party’s critics, this suggestion 
was unacceptable because it did not specify which 
interpretation of  Islamic Law it was referring to.
Despite its largely reformist understanding of  
sharia, which does not necessarily contradict demo-
cratic values, the movement ultimately avoided 
using the term so that it would not provide its 
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political enemies with a target, and after various 
consultations, debates, and negotiations, it decided 
not to include such a provision in the new constitu-
tion. Most Ennahdha members explained this deci-
sion with the will to avoid confusing the Tunisian 
public. “If  we use the word sharia, there is a lack 
of  precision and clarity.”10 The result of  this prag-
matic decision is that Article 1 of  the new constitu-
tion does not include any references to sharia while 
at the same time acknowledging the Islamic identity 
of  Tunisia: “Islam is the religion of  Tunisia,” the 
same wording as the old constitution of  1959.
Since Ennahdha was seeking to win as many votes 
as possible – and at the same time assuage fears 
against an Islamist takeover – consideration of  
public opinion is also reflected in its electoral plat-
form of  2011, where the word “sharia” is not even 
mentioned. This pragmatic decision once again 
shows that Ennahdha is highly attentive to the 
specifications of  the Tunisian public opinion and 
political landscape and acts accordingly.
Conclusion
While Ennahda’s limited tenure does not yet allow 
for any authoritative  conclusions on its democratic 
practice, scrutinizing the party’s  electoral plat-
form and positions adopted during the constitu-
tional  drafting process can be quite indicative. The 
party’s commitment to  democracy as a political 
and institutional order is uncontested, and so  is 
the commitment to pluralistic norms. This is not 
without limits,  however, but rather ends with the 
“protection of  the sacred,” which  could pose a 
threat to freedom of  expression in the future. The 
group’s  position on gender order is not fundamen-
talist, but it is nonetheless  conservative and could 
possibly lead to a restriction of  women’s rights 
(in  areas like inheritance laws, for example). And 
its performance during  the negotiations for the 
new constitution showed that many of  its  posi-
tions are far from fully elaborated. They are also 
not intransigent.
Overall, however, the case of  Ennahdha shows 
how an Islamist party can  reconcile Islamic val-
ues with democratic and pluralistic values; just 
not  with liberal ones. During this challenging pro-
cess, Ennahdha has  proven not only keen to dis-
cuss controversial issues but also  able to pursue a 
flexible and pragmatic approach. It has been able to 
compromise on numerous occasions and retreated 
from more  rigid positions when it was confronted 
with strong criticism from  Tunisia and abroad.
It is important to recall that Ennahdha was out-
lawed in Tunisia between  1991 and 2011 and as 
such, had no visible presence in the country  dur-
ing those years. This is therefore the first time 
that the party has  faced the realities of  having 
to govern a country, and it can be expected  that 
Ennahdha will continue to play a major political 
role in Tunisia  after the elections on October 26. 
Therefore, it will be even more  crucial to observe 
how its positions will translate into concrete  poli-
cies and legislation under the next parliament. 
This said, Ennahdha  is an Islamist movement that 
has evolved within a democratic context.  This 
democratic context made it not only necessary 
to discuss and sell  certain positions within the 
Islamist party and movement but has also  forced 
Ennahdha to debate and negotiate with other par-
ties (especially  within the three-party coalition) 
and within civil society as well as to  consider the 
broader Tunisian public. There is no doubt that the 
answer  to its democratic deficits is more inclusion 
and sustaining  democratic foundations.
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